UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A UNIFYING CONCEPT IN EQUITY by Pawlowski, Mark
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
79 
                                                          
UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A UNIFYING CONCEPT 
IN EQUITY 
 
Mark Pawlowski*
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article seeks to examine the extent to which a unified concept of 
unconscionability can be used to rationalise related doctrines of equity, in 
particular, in the areas of (1) unconscionable bargains, undue influence and 
duress (2) proprietary estoppel (3) knowing receipt liability and (4) relief 
against forfeitures. The conclusion is that such a process of amalgamation 
may provide a principled doctrinal basis for equity’s intervention which has 
already found favour in the English courts. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A recent discernible trend in equity has been the willingness of the 
English courts to adopt a broader-based doctrine of unconscionability as 
underlying proprietary estoppel claims and the personal liability of a stranger 
to a trust who has knowingly received trust property in breach of trust. The 
decisions in Gillett v Holt,1 Jennings v Rice2 and Campbell v Griffin3 in the 
context of proprietary estoppel and Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele4 on the subject of receipt liability, 
demonstrate the judiciary’s growing recognition that the concept of 
unconscionability provides a useful mechanism for affording equitable relief 
against the strict insistence on legal rights or unfair and oppressive conduct. 
This, in turn, prompts the question whether there are other areas which would 
benefit from a rationalisation of principles under the one umbrella of 
unconscionability.  
The process of amalgamation, it is submitted, would be particularly 
useful in areas where there are currently several related (but distinct) 
doctrines operating together so as to give rise to confusion and overlap in the 
same field of law. Most notably, it has already been suggested by some legal 
* Barrister, Professor of Property Law, Dept of Law, University of Greenwich. 
1 [2001] Ch 210, (CA). 
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 159, (CA). 
3 [2001] WLTR 981, (CA). See also, most recently, Ottey v Grundy [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1176. 
4 [2000] 4 All ER 221, (CA). 
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commentators that a radical overhaul of the doctrines of unconscionable 
bargains, undue influence and duress is much needed, with a view to 
providing a single, coherent principle justifying equity’s intervention to 
prevent the exploitation of the vulnerable. This can best be achieved it is 
submitted, by bringing together these various doctrines under one unified 
concept of unconscionable use of power. Another area, hitherto unexplored 
both academically and judicially, is equity’s jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeitures. Here again, it may be possible to unify the various criteria for 
relief under one overarching notion of unconscionability.  
 
UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS 
 
Although the jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable bargains was 
originally confined to reversioners and expectant heirs, it has since been 
extended to poor and ignorant persons and where the transaction in question 
was made at a considerable undervalue without the benefit of independent 
legal advice.5  More recently, it has been held that the modern equivalent of 
“poor and ignorant” is “a member of the lower income group  . . . less highly 
educated.”6 This broadening of the class of claimant eligible for relief has 
increased considerably the potential availability of the doctrine to a wider 
range of transactions where the terms are unconscionable and the victim does 
not receive independent legal advice. The essential elements of the doctrine 
were set out by Mr Peter Millett QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the High 
Court) in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd:7  
 
“First, one party has been at a serious disadvantage to the 
other, whether through poverty, or ignorance, or lack of 
advice, or otherwise, so that circumstances existed of which 
unfair advantage could be taken . . . Second, this weakness of 
the one party has been exploited by the other in some 
morally culpable manner . . . And third, the resulting 
transaction has been, not merely hard or improvident, but 
overreaching and oppressive.” 
 
A modern illustration of the jurisdiction is to be found in Boustany v 
Pigott,8 involving a lease of land, where the respondent was successful in 
establishing all three ingredients enabling the grant of a lease to be set aside. 
5 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312. 
6 Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255n, at 257, per Megarry J. 
7 [1983] 1 WLR 87, at 94-95. 
8 (1995) 69 P & C R 298, (PC). 
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Similarly, in the earlier case of Creswell v Potter,9 a conveyance of the 
matrimonial home executed by a wife in favour of her husband was set aside 
as an unconscionable bargain. Although the wife was employed as a 
telephonist requiring considerable alertness and skill, she could properly be 
described as “ignorant” in the context of property transactions. There was 
also, clearly, an undervalue since she only received a release from her 
liability under an existing mortgage in return for giving up all her interest in 
the matrimonial home which had increased in value. There was also no 
suggestion that she had had any independent legal advice. Again, in 
Backhouse v Backhouse,10 the wife, in the course of divorce proceedings, 
executed a deed transferring her interest in the matrimonial home to her 
husband without seeking independent legal advice. She received no 
consideration for the transfer except release from her liability under the 
mortgage. Balcombe J concluded (albeit obiter) that all three elements 
necesssary to set aside the transaction on the ground that it was an 
unconscionable bargain had been made out.  
In many cases, the facts may give rise to a potential defence based on 
either the doctrine of undue influence (discussed below) or equity’s 
jurisdiction to relieve against unconscionable bargains.  This has been 
recognised judicially, most notably in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v 
Burch,11 where Nourse L J accepted that the legal charge in favour of the 
bank could have been set aside as an unconscionable bargain (as opposed to 
the claimant relying on undue influence) stating that such jurisdiction was 
still “in good heart and capable of adaptation to different transactions entered 
into in changing circumstances.”12 Undoubtedly, there are strong similarities 
between the two doctrines and this has motivated a number of academic 
commentators to urge for a merger of the two sets of principles into one 
overarching notion of unconscionability.  Indeed, the recognition in Burch 
that the O’Brien13 principle is an application of unconscionability has 
prompted some writers14 to suggest that the true basis of the decision in the 
former case was not the absence of the claimant’s real consent (ie, undue 
influence) but the unconscionable conduct on the part of the bank in 
accepting a transaction which was so heavily unbalanced. 
 
9 [1978] 1 WLR 255n. 
10 [1978] 1 All ER 1158. 
11 [1997] 1 All ER 144, (CA). 
12 Ibid at 151. 
13 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417, (HL). 
14 See, eg, M Chen-Wishart “The O’Brien Principle and Substantive Fairness”, 
[1997] 56 CLJ 60, at 63. 
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UNDUE INFLUENCE 
 
A rare opportunity to consider the interaction between unconscionable 
bargains and undue influence claims arose in the case of Portman Building 
Society v Dusangh.15 Here, the building society granted a mortgage to the 
defendant, who was elderly (aged 72 years of age), illiterate and on a very 
low income. The mortgage was guaranteed by the defendant’s son, who 
received the bulk of the sum advanced and used it to purchase a supermarket.  
The same solicitor acted for all parties. The supermarket business was not a 
success and the son fell behind with the mortgage repayments. When the 
building society sought possession of the property, the defendant argued that 
he was entitled to set aside the charge directly against the society as an 
unconscionable bargain.  On the facts, the defendant’s argument failed since 
all the requisite ingredients of an unconscionable bargain were found to be 
lacking.  The defendant was not at a serious disadvantage to the building 
society (having no existing indebtedness towards it), his situation was not 
exploited by the society, and the society had not acted in a morally 
reprehensible manner. Accordingly, the transaction, although improvident, 
was not oppressive and the conscience of the court was not shocked. 
In the course of his judgment, Ward L J adopted the approach taken by 
Mason J in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio,16 who sought to 
distinguish the two concepts in the following way:17
 
“In [undue influence] the will of the innocent party is not 
independent and voluntary because it is overborne. In 
[unconscionable conduct cases] the will of the innocent 
party, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of the 
disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the 
other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that 
position.” 
 
In essence, therefore, the suggestion here is that undue influence is 
concerned with the weakness of the complainant’s consent resulting from 
over-dependence on the defendant’s judgment, skill or expertise. By contrast, 
the doctrine of unconscionable bargains, it is suggested, places greater 
emphasis on the defendant’s exploitation of the complainant’s weakness (ie, 
the wrongful conduct of the defendant). This is the approach taken by Birks 
15 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221, (CA). 
16 (1985) 15 CLR 447, (High Court of Australia). 
17 Ibid at 461. 
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and Chin18, who view undue influence cases as “plaintiff-sided” because the 
essence of the doctrine is the complainant’s dependency on the defendant as 
opposed to the defendant’s wrongdoing. Thus, they point out that, in the 
presumed undue influence category, the defendant’s conduct does not usually 
involve any actual coercion or abuse; the doctrine operates simply to remove 
from the defendant benefits which he has passively obtained under the 
transaction.  Moreover, the defendant can rebut the presumption by 
establishing that the claimant entered into the transaction freely and with 
informed consent; the rebuttal focuses on consent and is not concerned with 
unconscionable conduct on the defendant’s part. Even in some cases 
involving actual undue influence, say Birks and Chin, the evidence is merely 
that the defendant made the decision for the complainant and with the 
intention of benefiting him (or her).19
Other commentators,20 however, have argued that there is a close 
relationship between the principles relating to undue influence and 
unconscionable bargains and that the two doctrines should be fused within an 
all-embracing doctrine of unconscionability. According to Capper,21 for 
example, the two doctrines share three common features, namely, (1) 
inequality of bargaining position (ie, relational inequality); (2) transactional 
imbalance; and (3) unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant. So 
far as the requirement of relational inequality is concerned, this is present in 
presumed undue influence cases because the complainant must prove the 
existence of a relationship under which he (or she) generally reposed trust 
and confidence in the wrongdoer. Such relationships are “infinitely 
various”22 and do not warrant precise definition. They are not necessarily 
fiduciary but a vital element is confidentiality. Relational inequality is always 
present (by definition) in actual undue influence cases. The requirement is 
also to be found in unconscionability cases in that the complainant must be 
18 Birks and Chin “On the Nature of Undue Influence” in Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law, (Beatson and Friedmann, ed, 1985, at 57-97). 
19 See, Dunbar Bank plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All ER 876. 
20 See, eg, R Bigwood “Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked 
Exploitation’?” (1996) 16 O J L S 503, who argues that both undue influence and 
unconscionable dealings concern a form of “exploitation”, although the source of the 
claimant’s vulnerability is different in each case. In his view, however, despite 
definitional differences between the two concepts, “there is no logical reason” why 
the jurisdiction of unconscionable dealings could not include undue influence and 
duress: Ibid at 514. 
21 D Capper “Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation”, (1998) 
114 LQR 479. 
22 National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821, at 831, per Lord 
Scarman. 
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shown to be suffering from some special disadvantage to warrant equity’s 
intervention. The complainant’s disabling circumstances, as we have seen, 
have been given a broad interpretation by the English courts. In Multiservice 
Bookbinding Ltd v Marden,23 for example, Browne-Wilkinson J stated24 that 
the categories of unconscionable bargains were not limited and that “the 
court can and should intervene where a bargain has been procured by unfair 
means.”  There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that the English courts 
would be reluctant to grant relief in a wide range of circumstances.25
Turning to transactional imbalance, Capper concedes that this 
requirement does not feature in the actual undue influence category, which 
requires mere proof of actual coercion over the weaker party. His argument, 
however, is that transactional imbalance (ie, the bargain itself must be 
oppressive) is not an essential requirement of any undue influence or 
unconscionability case (albeit invariably present), but simply “powerful 
evidence in support of relational inequality and unconscionable conduct, 
which are the true invalidating grounds.”26 On this point, he (like other 
commentators) doubt whether manifest disadvantage should be an essential 
feature of the presumed undue influence category.  The better view, largely 
endorsed now by the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge 
(No. 2)27 is that the primary function of manifest disadvantage is evidentiary 
in deciding whether there is any issue of abuse which can properly be raised 
by the complainant. As such, it is only one of the factors determining whether 
a successful plea of undue influence has been made out. According to 
Capper, transactional imbalance is also not an essential precondition to 
finding an unconscionable bargain.  Although many of the unconscionability 
cases do involve sales at an undervalue and other forms of contractual 
imbalance, this is not always the case.  He concludes that “if manifest 
disadvantage assumes the evidential role recommended for it in respect of 
presumed undue influence, then assimilation with actual undue influence and 
unconscionability becomes relatively easy.”28
Finally, so far as unconscionable conduct is concerned, this is, according 
to Capper, a requirement of both doctrines. It is clearly evident in actual 
undue influence cases and is an essential feature of the unconscionability 
23 [1979] Ch 84. 
24 Ibid 110. 
25 It is apparent, for example, that inability to speak English, if taken advantage of, 
may come within the doctrine: Barclays Bank plc v Scwartz, The Times, August 2, 
1995, unreported. 
26 Ibid at 486. 
27 [2001] 4 All ER 449, (HL). See, M Thompson, “Wives, Sureties and Banks”, 
[2002] Conv 174. 
28 Ibid at 500. 
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cases. In his view, “actual undue influence (without pressure) is only 
different from presumed undue influence in so far as what is presumed in the 
latter is affirmatively proved in the former.”29 Although in the presumed 
undue influence category, coercion and abuse by the defendant is less easy to 
discern, nevertheless, many of the cases on unconscionable dealing also 
concern little more than passive acceptance of benefits received under 
unconscionable circumstances.30
Capper’s persuasive argument for a new combined doctrine is mirrored 
by another academic writer, Chen-Wishart,31 who argues that 
“unconscionability should be recognised as the informing principle at the root 
of the O’Brien formulation which is, in turn, merely one application of the 
unconscionability jurisdiction.”32 She also suggests that both doctrines reflect 
same concerns and are subject to the same burden of proof. First, the 
requirement of “special disability” in unconscionable dealing cases is 
reflected, under the O’Brien doctrine, “in the need to show that the surety’s 
consent was tainted by the debtor’s undue influence or misrepresentation.” 
Secondly, the requirement of an “improvident transaction” corresponds with 
the O’Brien requirement that the transaction be manifestly disadvantageous 
(at least in the presumed undue influence category). Finally, the element of 
“unconscientious advantage-taking” is mirrored in the need to show, under 
O’Brien, “that the lender has constructive notice of the undue influence but 
obtains the benefit of the transaction without taking adequate steps to meet 
that suspected influence.”33
The unifying doctrine of unconscionability can, therefore, also be 
extended to embrace the liability of a third party lender in circumstances 
where it has actual or constructive notice that the loan transaction is tainted 
with undue influence, misrepresentation or some other equitable wrongdoing.  
Significantly, in Portman Building Society v Dusangh34, Ward L J recognised 
that the doctrine of notice (as explained in O’Brien) could apply in the 
context of an unconscionable dealing so as to bind the lender in the same way 
as in a case involving undue influence.  His Lordship relied on a passage in 
29 Ibid at 493. 
30 See, eg, Hart v O’Conor [1985] A C 1000, at 1024, (PC), where Lord Brightman 
explained the meaning of unconscionable conduct in this context as: “ . . . 
victimisation, which can consist either of the active extortion of a benefit or the 
passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances.” 
31 M Chen-Wishart, “The O’Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness”, [1997] CLJ 
60.  
32 Ibid at 62. 
33 Ibid at 62.  See also, J R F Lehane, “Undue Influence, Misrepresentation and Third 
Parties”, (1994) 110 LQR 167, at 173. 
34 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221, (CA). 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech in O’Brien where he stated35 that a wife 
who has been induced to stand as a surety for her husband’s debts “by his 
undue influence, misrepresentation or some other legal wrong” had an equity 
as against him to set aside the transaction. In his view, unconscionable 
conduct was “some other legal wrong” and, therefore, the principles in 
O’Brien relating to notice and third parties were equally applicable in cases 
involving unconscionable bargains.36 Although, clearly, the current law 
focuses on a test of notice, there is no reason why the principle could not be 
reformulated so that, if a lender has the requisite degree of knowledge of an 
unconscionable transaction (eg, between a husband and wife), it will itself be 
treated as acting unconscionably in relying on the transaction.37
 
DURESS 
 
There is no reason why, it is submitted, the related doctrine of common law 
duress should not also feature in this assimilation process since it also 
embodies notions of relational inequality and unconscionable conduct 
associated with the doctrines of undue influence and unconscionable 
dealings.  
Although originally confined to threats or acts of violence to the person 
or to goods, the concept of duress has now been extended to include a wide 
range of threats including those to a party’s economic and business interests. 
The current trigger for duress, however, is different from that used is undue 
influence cases. Essentially, the complainant has to prove two elements, 
namely, (1) that the threat of pressure was illegitimate; and (2) the lack of a 
reasonable or realistic alternative to making the contract.38 Where, however, 
what is threatened is not a civil wrong (ie, a breach of contract or tort) but a 
crime, only the first element need be proved. A good example of the 
operation of the doctrine is to be found in B & S Contracts & Design Ltd v 
Victor Green Publications Ltd,39 where a builder agreed to erect stands for an 
exhibition at Olympia, London. Less than a week before the opening of the 
exhibition, the builder told the owner that he would not do it without extra 
35  [1994] 4 All ER 417, at 428, (HL). 
36 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221, at 233-234. See also, Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, at 153, (CA), per Millet L J 
37 See, eg Shoppers Trust Co v Dynamic Homes Ltd (1993) 96 DLR (4d) 267, 
(Ontario Court), where it was held to be unconscionable to permit the lender to take 
advantage of the mortgage in the absence of proper independent legal advice. 
38 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ 
Federation and Laughton [1983] A C 366, (HL). 
39 [1984] ICR 419, (CA). 
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payment to satisfy the demands of his workforce. Failure to erect the stands 
in time for the exhibition would have been disastrous for the owner, so he 
gave way to the demand and paid the extra amount. It was held that this was 
clearly illegitimate pressure and the owner had no real option but to accede to 
the demand. Accordingly, the extra amount was recoverable as money paid 
under duress. 
As we have seen, the doctrine of undue influence is based on the notion 
of actual (or presumed) pressure being exerted over the complainant so that 
he (or she) is unable to form a free and informed decision to enter into the 
transaction.  In the presumed undue influence category, unlike duress, the 
doctrine relies on establishing a relationship of trust and confidence between 
the parties which leads one party to place reliance on the other’s impartial 
judgment and advice.  In the actual undue influence category, however, the 
difference with duress is less easy to discern. Here, the question is largely the 
same, namely, whether consent was induced by pressure which the law does 
not regard as legitimate. Several academic commentators have, therefore, 
argued strongly for the assimilation of actual undue influence cases involving 
pressure within the ambit of the doctrine of duress.40 Most recently, in Royal 
Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2),41 Lord Nicholls opined that “today there 
is much overlap with the principle of duress as this principle has 
subsequently developed.”42  
 
PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL 
 
Undoubtedly, the modern trend of English case law is to apply a broad 
notion of unconscionability in proprietary estoppel claims. This trend was 
begun by Oliver J in Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co 
Ltd,43 who, referring to Fry J’s five probanda in Willmott v Barber,44 was 
able to identify from the authorities45 “a much wider equitable jurisdiction to 
interfere in cases where the assertion of strict legal rights is found by the 
40 Birks and Chin “On the Nature of Undue Influence” in Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law, (Beatson and Friedman, ed, 1995). See also, A Phang “Undue 
Influence Methodolgy, Sources and Linkages”, [1995] JBL 552, at 566. 
41 [2001] 4 All ER 449, (HL). See also, Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons 
Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389, at 394-395, per Porter J. 
42 Ibid at 457. 
43 [1982] QB 133. 
44 (1880) 15 Ch D 96. 
45 In particular, Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, (CA); E R Ives Investment Ltd v 
High [1967] 2 QB 379, (CA) and Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179, 
(CA). 
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court to be unconscionable.”46 The broad approach taken by Oliver J was 
adopted by Robert Goff J in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v 
Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd,47 who also emphasised the flexible 
nature of the estoppel doctrine and rejected rigid over-categorisation. In the 
same case, Lord Denning M R (in the Court of Appeal) perceived all forms 
of estoppel (ie, proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, 
estoppel by acquiescence and promissory estoppel) as merging into one 
general principle shorn of limitations, namely:48
 
“When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an 
underlying assumption - either of fact or law - whether due 
to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on 
which they have conducted the dealings between them – 
neither of them will be allowed to go back on that 
assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to 
do so.” 
 
Subsequently, the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v 
Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd49 referred with approval to a 
general test, indicated by Scarman L J in Crabb v Arun District Council,50 
that equity will interfere if “it would be unconscionable and unjust to allow 
the defendants to set up their undoubted rights against the claim being made 
by the plaintiff.” Their Lordships also approved the judgment of Oliver J in 
Taylor Fashions, reiterated in the Court of Appeal in Habib Bank Ltd v 
Habib Bank AG Zurich,51 and also the above-cited passage from the 
judgment of Lord Denning M R in the Amalgamated Investment case. 
More recently, the Court of Appeal in Gillett v Holt52 has, once again, 
openly recognised that the proprietary estoppel doctrine is founded on a 
generalised theory of unconscionability. In the words of Robert Walker L J.53
 
“ . . . the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to 
prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements 
of the doctrine.” 
46 Ibid at 147. 
47 [1982] QB 84, at 103-104.  
48 Ibid at 122. 
49 [1987] 2 WLR 343, (PC). 
50 [1976] Ch 179, at 195, (CA). 
51 [1981] 1 WLR 1265, at 1285, (CA). 
52 [2001] Ch 210, (CA). 
53 Ibid at 225. 
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Although a proprietary estoppel claim will fail unless the claimant is able 
to prove the three essential elements of assurance, reliance and detriment, it is 
evident from the Gillett ruling that these prerequisites are not “watertight 
compartments” and that “the quality of the relevant assurances may influence 
the issue of reliance, [and] that reliance and detriment are often 
intertwined.”54 In this connection, Robert Walker L J also recognised that “in 
the end the court must look at the matter in the round” and that, ultimately, 
the process involves “a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an 
assurance ir or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.”55   
It is submitted that these observations mark the beginning of the 
expansion of proprietary estoppel doctrine into a wider notion of 
“unconscientious dealing” in relation to property. This has been highlighted 
in several recent decisions, namely, Jennings v Rice,56 Campbell v Griffin,57 
Ottey v Grundy,58 Uglow v Uglow59 and Murphy v Burrows,60 all of which 
stress the court’s considerable flexibility in determining the appropriate 
award in satisfying the claimant’s estoppel equity. In particular, they 
emphasise that the primary function of proprietary estoppel is not to protect 
expectations but to prevent unconscionable conduct and to do justice between 
the parties.  Although such a principle will inevitably give rise to a more 
protracted assessment of the circumstances in a given case, it is, in the 
writer’s view, to be welcomed as giving further support to the simple 
proposition, already expressed elsewhere,61 that where a person has induced 
another into an expectation, the court should provide a remedy if it would be 
unconscionable to deny it. 
 
KNOWING RECEIPT LIABILITY 
 
There has been much debate, in recent years, over the correct test for 
determining when a stranger to a trust will be held personally liable as a 
constructive trustee for receipt of trusts assets in breach of trust.  The 
orthodox view has been that the concept of knowledge underpins the personal 
liability of a stranger in this context.  This approach, however, was firmly 
54 Ibid at  225, per Robert Walker L J. 
55 Ibid at 232. 
56 [2002] EWCA Civ 159, (CA). 
57 [2001] W & T L R 981, (CA). 
58 [2003] EWCA Civ 1176, (CA). 
59 [2004] EWCA Civ 987, (CA). 
60 [2004] EWHC 1900. 
61 M Halliwel, “Estoppel: Unconscionability as a Cause of Action”, (1994) 14 LS 15. 
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rejected by the Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele,62 which has adopted a more general 
concept of unconscionability in preference to a strict test of knowledge.  
Interestingly, Nourse L J (who gave the leading judgment) considered the 
different “Baden” categories of knowledge63 as helpful, but only in 
determining dishonesty for the purposes of accessory liability. In the 
knowing receipt cases, his Lordship preferred to base liability on the concept 
of unconscionability which, in his view, accorded with the approach taken by 
Buckley L J in Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 
2),64 namely, whether the recipient can “conscientiously retain [the] funds 
against the company”65 or, in the words of Megarry V-C in Re Montagu’s 
Settlement Trusts66, “the recipient’s conscience is sufficiently affected for it 
to be right to bind him by the obligations of a constructive trustee.”67  Looked 
at in this way, there was no need to resort to the Baden categorisation 
(whether or not reduced to the division between actual and constructive 
knowledge) since, in all cases, the test was simply whether the recipient’s 
knowledge was such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the 
benefit of the receipt. 
In effect, the Akindele ruling has introduced a single test of 
unconscionability for knowing receipt cases. In Nourse L J’s view, a single 
test based on unconscionability ought to avoid the difficulties of “definition 
and allocation to which the previous categorisations [of knowledge] have 
led.”68 His Lordship also considered that such a test would make it easier for 
the courts to give common-sense decisions in the commercial context, in 
which most knowing receipt claims are made. One practical consequence, 
however, of adopting a broader-based doctrine of unconscionability in this 
context (as in proprietary estoppel cases) is that it will tend to give rise to a 
more sophisticated (and protracted) assessment of the facts in a given case. 
This is true also of the accessory liability category where, once again, 
knowledge has been avoided as a defining ingredient in favour of a single test 
of dishonesty.69 Is it true to say, therefore, that for both categories of 
constructive trust, the terms dishonesty and unconscionability are now largely 
synonymous?   
62 [2000] 4 All ER 221, (CA). 
63 See, Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v Société Générale pour Favoriser le 
Developement du Commerce et de L’Industrie en France SA, [1992] 4 All ER 161. 
64 [1980] 1 All ER 393, (CA). 
65 Ibid at 405. 
66 [1992] 4 All ER 308. 
67 Ibid at 323-324. 
68 [2000] 4 All ER 221, at 236. 
69 Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 3 All ER 97, (CA). 
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This is an interesting question to which there is no easy answer. It is 
submitted, however, that the tests are different despite the obvious 
similarities in language. Dishonesty, in the context of accessory liability 
means conscious impropriety. Moreover, it must be established that the 
recipient’s conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people and that he himself realised that, by those standards, his 
conduct was dishonest.70 So, for example, participating in a transaction 
knowing it involves a misapplication of trust funds will constitute dishonesty. 
Equally, deliberately closing one’s eyes to the obvious or deliberately not 
asking questions will give rise to liability. However, mere carelessness or 
negligence will not be enough. In the recipient liability category, however, 
constructive knowledge of a breach of trust (ie, Baden categories (4) and (5)) 
may give rise to liability, albeit only exceptionally, where “there is no 
justification on the known facts for allowing a commercial man who has 
received funds paid to him in breach of trust to plead the shelter of the 
exigencies of commercial life.”71 In such cases, it may well be 
unconscionable for the recipient to retain the benefit of the funds despite the 
absence of proof of any actual knowledge (or recklessness) on his part (ie, 
Baden categories (1)-(3)). 
 
RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE 
 
It is possible also to rationalise equity’s jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeitures under one unified concept of unconscionability. More specifically, 
it is submitted that equity will have jurisdiction to grant relief against 
forfeiture where the unconscionability falls to be characterised by reference 
to (1) the nature of the transaction; (2) the contractual stipulation; or (3) the 
party’s misconduct or unjust enrichment. Each of these is discussed briefly 
below. 
 
The nature of the transaction 
 
The inquiry here focuses on identifying the nature of the bargain struck 
between the parties.  The court intervenes to prevent the innocent party from 
insisting on his strict legal rights by reference to the nature of the contract 
itself and the circumstances at the time it was made.  If the forfeiture clause is 
inserted as a security for the payment of money, equity will invariably grant 
70 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 All ER 377, (HL). 
71 Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin [1985] NZLR 41, per Richardson J, cited 
with approval by Nourse L J in Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2000] 4 All ER 221, (CA), at 234 and 236. 
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relief upon payment by the party in default of the amount owing together 
with interest and costs. This accords with the nature of the bargain made 
between the parties because the innocent party obtains the benefit of his 
bargain if he receives his money (albeit late) with compensation. In this 
situation, the object of the contractual stipulation is achieved and it would be 
unconscionable for the innocent party to expect more and take advantage of 
the forfeiture.  Thus, by the very nature of the transaction, acting upon 
conscience, equity grants relief. The equitable jurisdiction to grant relief 
against forfeiture for non-payment of rent may be explained on this basis. 
If the forfeiture clause is inserted as a security to achieve a stated result 
other than the payment of money, equity has jurisdiction to grant relief where 
the stated result can effectively be attained when the matter comes before the 
court.72 Here again, once performance of the primary purpose is achieved, it 
would be unconscientious for the innocent party to insist on his strict legal 
rights and demand a forfeiture. 
 
The contractual stipulation 
 
If the forfeiture clause is construed as a penalty, equity will disregard the 
contractual provision and afford the innocent party relief.73 This is because it 
would be unconscionable for the innocent party to rely upon a penalty. For 
example, the forfeiture clause may provide for the retention of instalments 
already paid which are wholly out of proportion to the possible damage 
suffered by the innocent party. In this situation, the courts have tended to 
assume (without discussion) that a forfeiture clause is penal given that the 
purchaser in default stands to lose all instalments already paid regardless of 
the extent to which the seller may have suffered damage as a result of the 
default.74 Alternatively, the clause may provide for the re-transfer of 
property, the value of which bears no relationship to the likely loss 
occasioned by the breach.75
 
The party’s misconduct or unjust enrichment 
 
72 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] A C 691, (HL). 
73 Most recently, in Warnborough Ltd v Garmite Ltd [2006] EWHC 10 (Ch), Mr 
Richard Sheldon QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court) opined, at para 
117, that: “. . . there is a strong similarity between penalty clauses and forfeiture 
clauses and the boundaries of each jurisdiction are becoming increasingly blurred.” 
74 Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, (CA), per Somervell and Denning L JJ. 
75 Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 All ER 621, (CA). 
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Here, the forfeiture clause may be unimpeachable but the innocent 
party’s conduct subsequent to entering into the contract may justify equity’s 
intervention. In other words, there may be an unconscionable exercise of the 
innocent party’s legal rights. The inquiry no longer centres around the nature 
of the transaction or the forfeiture provision but to the innocent party’s 
conduct at the time when relief is sought. Thus, equity will intervene where 
the innocent party has taken an unfair advantage of the party in default. 
Reference may be made here to the old Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction 
to relieve in cases of fraud, accident, mistake and surprise, as illustrated by a 
number of early authorities.76  In these cases, the principle of freedom of 
contract is maintained because equity is merely relieving the defaulting party, 
who would otherwise complete the complete the contract, from the 
consequences of a breach induced by the unconscionable behaviour of the 
innocent party. An “unconscionable rescission” is also illustrated by the 
celebrated American case of Cheney v Libby,77 where the purchaser had 
failed to pay an instalment of the purchase price in dollars on the due date 
largely because he had been misled by the vendor into thinking that another 
form of payment would be acceptable. On discovering the mistake, he 
promptly tendered the instalment in the correct money. The Supreme Court 
concluded that to permit the vendor to forfeit the contract would be to enable 
him to take advantage of his own wrong. Interestingly, the point was also 
addressed in Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding,78 where Viscount Dilhorne 
intimated that the cases in which it would be right to give equitable relief 
against forfeiture involving a wilful breach of covenant would be likely to be 
few in number “and where the conduct of the person seeking to secure the 
forfeiture has been wholly unreasonable and of a rapacious and 
unconscionable character.”79  
The innocent party’s unjust enrichment may also warrant equity’s 
intervention, particularly where the disparity between his loss and the value 
of the property forfeited would render it unconscionable for him to enforce 
his legal rights. In Legione v Hateley,80 the purchaser’s breach was neither 
serious nor deliberate and the balance of the purchase money was tendered 
only a few days after the expiry of the notice to complete. Moreover, the 
purchasers had constructed a house on the land after going into possession at 
76 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439; Barrow v Isaacs [1891] 
1 QB 417 and Upjohn v Macfarlane [1922] 2 Ch 256. 
77 (1890) 134 US 68. See also, Legione v Hateley (1983) 46 ALR 1, (High Court of 
Australia). 
78 [1973] A C 691, (HL). 
79 Ibid at 726. 
80 (1983) 46 ALR 1, (High Court of Australia). 
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a cost of $35,000.  Although not reaching a concluded view on the matter, the 
High Court of Australia intimated that those circumstances taken by 
themselves would render the vendor’s rescission unconscionable.81  
The English courts, although adopting a more traditionalist approach, 
have also recognised that the intervention of equity to grant relief to a 
defaulting purchaser may be justified in exceptional circumstances. Thus, 
where the vendor would be unjustly enriched by improvements made at the 
purchaser’s expense (or where, as we have seen, the vendor has contributed 
to the breach), the courts appear more willing to grant equitable relief as a 
preliminary to the decree of specific performance. Although the grant of such 
relief constitutes a clear departure from the bargain made between the parties 
(in particular, the term making time of the essence), nevertheless, it will be 
permitted in circumstances where it would be unconscionable for the vendor 
to assert his strict contractual rights. Thus, by way of illustration, in Re 
Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co,82 the Court of Appeal declared a term 
providing for forfeiture of half the purchase price to be a penalty and granted 
relief by way of a decree of specific performance of the contract, despite an 
express provision making time of the essence. An important feature of the 
case was that the purchaser had been in possession of the land pending 
completion for five years, during which time it had constructed a dock at its 
own expense. In this case, therefore, there were special features, based on the 
vendor’s unjust enrichment, which made it unconscionable for the vendor to 
rescind the contract and recover the property.  More significantly, in 
Hedworth v Jenwise,83 the Court of Appeal was prepared to accept (although 
not deciding the point) that the principle in Legione was applicable in the 
English jurisdiction. In Hedworth, however, the facts did not warrant “this 
exceptional form of relief”84 and the Legione case was distinguished on the 
basis that it was not simply land which was being forfeited but land with a 
house which the purchasers had built on after taking possession before 
completion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
One serious objection to any process of amalgamation of related 
doctrines under the one umbrella of unconscionability is the notion that this 
81 See also, Ciavarella v Balmer (1983) 57 AJLR 632, (High Court of Australia) and 
Stern v McArthur (1988) 62 ALJR 588, (High Court of Australia). 
82 (1873) LR 8 Ch 1022, (CA). 
83 [1994] EGCS  133, (CA). 
84 Ibid per Balcombe L J  
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would lead to considerable uncertainty in our law.85 As one commentator has 
put it, “the problem with this doctrine [of unconscionable dealings] is that it 
may prove as long as the Chancellor’s foot and open up new vistas of 
litigation and uncertainty.”86 The uncertainty argument should not, however, 
be overstated. As with most other doctrines, a broader notion of 
unconscionability would inevitably lead to the laying down of more specific 
guidelines for determining its application. At the same time, there would be a 
more systematic approach to the development of the requisite principles 
which would avoid the current overlap and confusion arising from several 
related but currently distinct doctrines. This is particularly so in relation to 
the current law on undue influence, unconscionable bargains and duress.  
What is also significant is that the English courts have already adopted 
the concept of unconscionability as underlying specific areas of equity, most 
notably, proprietary estoppel doctrine87 and cases involving liability for 
knowing receipt. Here, despite the concept being expressed in fairly broad 
terms, the courts have sought to exercise the jurisdiction according to well-
defined principles. Thus, as we have seen, in proprietary estoppel cases, there 
is still a requirement that the claimant show the requisite ingredients of 
assurance and detrimental reliance.  The doctrine, however, is only triggered 
if the legal owner can be shown to have taken unconscionable advantage of 
the claimant by denying him (or her) the right or interest they expected to 
receive. There is no question, therefore, of the courts administering a general 
discretionary power to uphold promises simply because it would be unfair or 
harsh to allow the defendant to go back on them. The same can be said of the 
current approach to recipient liability where the need for precise 
categorisation of the recipient’s state of knowledge has been rejected in 
favour of a single test based on unconscionability of receipt.   
There are also other areas where a unified concept of unconscionability 
can be invoked as an attempt at rationalisation. Apart from equity’s 
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture, the Court of Appeal decision in 
Pennington v Waine,88 in the context of equity’s jurisdiction to perfect 
85 See, for example, the observations of Lord Hoffmann in Union Eagle Ltd v Golden 
Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514, at 519, PC 
86 N S Price “Undue Influence: Finis Litium?” (1999) 115 LQR 8, at 10. 
87 Interestingly, the theoretical basis for imposing a constructive trust in the context 
of the family home is now seen as being no different to the rationale underlying the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel namely, that equity is acting on the conscience of the 
legal owner so as to produce a fair result between the parties in the light of all the 
circumstances: Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546. 
88 [2002] 1 WLR 2075, (CA). 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
96 
                                                          
imperfect gifts, has attempted to rationalise earlier case law89 under the single 
umbrella of unconscionability. In essence, equity will now intervene to 
perfect the gift if the circumstances in which the legal formalities are not 
completed make it unconscionable for equity to deny the gift. Although the 
case has been criticised for providing the courts with an unfettered discretion 
to perfect imperfect transactions90, it does provide a rational basis for 
imposing a constructive trust on the transferor as a means of justifying a 
transfer of the property in equity.91 Again, most recently, the Court of Appeal 
in Harris v Williams-Wynne92 has held that, where a covenant not to build on 
land has been breached but no action has been taken for some years, the test 
to be applied in determining whether the claim should proceed was whether it 
would be unconscionable in all the circumstances for the claimant to seek to 
enforce rights he undoubtedly had at the date of the breach of covenant. The 
Court acknowledged that, ultimately, the decision turned on the facts of each 
individual case. 
Admittedly, English courts are still a long way from recognising a 
principled, universal doctrine of unconscionability, but there is no doubt that 
the “possible lines of development have been charted if the courts are bold 
enough to take them.”93
89 Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co v Rose [1949] Ch 78; Re Rose, (dec’d), 
Rose v IRC [1952] Ch 499 and Mascall v Mascall (1985) 49 P & C R 119. 
90 See, M Halliwell, “Perfecting Imperfect Gifts and Trusts: Have We Reached the 
End of the Chancellor’s Foot?” [2003] Conv 192. 
91 See, J Garton, “The Role of the Trust Mechanism in the Rule in Re Rose, [2003] 
Conv 364. 
92 Unreported, 2 February 2006, (available on Lawtel). 
93 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, (7th NZ ed, 1988), at 123, 
writing in the context of the English judiciary’s reluctance to entertain a wider notion 
of “unconscientious dealing.” 
